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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this thesis is to expose the negotiation 
process during which the United States and Colombia negotiated 
a narcotics eradication package during 1975-1980.
A negotiations model called formula-detail was used to 
examine the various stages of the talks between the two 
nations. Further, the final chapter evaluates the most 
important detail of the negotiations, the US-Colombian 
extradition treaty.
The model illustrated the various stages of the talks and 
provided insights into the circumstances that influenced their 
eventual outcome. In addition, the model identified errors 
in the negotiation process that would later prove to 
contribute to the demise of the principle detail, the 
extradition treaty.
The thesis suggests that because US policy-makers could 
not agree on a domestic narcotics policy, they chose an 
international drug eradication strategy. The ensuing US 
formula placed excessive pressure on Third World drug- 
exporting nations like Colombia. Unfortunately, Colombia did 
not possess the manpower nor financial resources to implement 
the negotiated formula. When the Colombian Supreme Court 
declared the extradition treaty unconstitutional, the formula 
was essentially obsolete.
Finally, the thesis examines specifically the extradition 
treaty and portrays an agreement whose failure was predestined 
by the asymmetry of the preceding negotiation process.
v
UNITED STATES— COLOMBIAN NEGOTIATIONS ON NARCOTICS CONTROL
1975-1980
CHAPTER I
THE DIAGNOSTIC PHASE
Introduction
Many political scientists have developed theories and 
models of negotiation. Unfortunately, very few theorists 
address the obstacles developing countries face when 
confronted with the overwhelming prospect of negotiating with 
powerful First World nations. The end result of this 
asymmetrical negotiation usually relegated the weaker country 
to a less than optimal outcome. In a recent book, Power and 
Tactics in International Negotiation, author William Mark 
Habeeb explores the options developing countries have at their 
disposal when they negotiate with more powerful counterparts. 
Habeeb believes that a weaker nation can change the 
circumstances under which negotiations occur to increase its 
chances of emerging successfully from negotiations. The 
formal process on which Habeeb elaborates is called formula- 
detail negotiation. This chapter will use the formula-detail 
model and apply it to negotiations between the United States
^William Mark Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International 
Negotiation. (Baltimore: The Johns Jopkins University Press,
1988), 71.
2
3and Colombia, to analyze why Colombia would enter into talks 
with the U.S. on narcotics eradication via an extradition 
treaty, a subject they had previously been unwilling to 
discuss.
The Formula-Detail Model
The formula-detail approach was developed by Zartman and 
Berman in The Practical Negotiator. Unlike game theory or 
zero-sum notions, these authors posit that the secret of 
negotiation is to change the perception of conflict and, in 
the process, change the stakes into items that can be used to 
benefit both parties. The model identifies three stages in 
the negotiation process: (1) diagnosis of the situation and
the decision to try negotiations; (2) negotiation of a formula 
or common definition of the conflict in terms amenable to a 
solution; and (3) negotiation of the details to implement the 
formula on precise points of dispute.
All negotiations commence with the decision to actually 
begin a dialogue for the purposes of solving the conflict and 
the talks between the U.S. and Colombia were no exception. 
This "diagnostic" phase, as Zartman and Berman call it, can 
be the result of several catalysts. In the case of the U.S.- 
Colombian negotiations, three of these catalysts were present: 
propitious changes had taken place such that the once-
^illiam Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical 
Negotiator. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 13, 9.
4recalcitrant Colombians were now willing to enter into talks 
with the U.S.; the goal of negotiations (narcotics 
eradication) was not unilaterally attainable and thus required 
a joint decision that could only be arrived at via 
negotiations; and finally, both sides perceived that they
o
would be better off with an agreement than without one. In 
other words, the U.S. and Colombia had an interest in changing 
the status quo.
An examination of the diagnostic phase will follow, 
illustrating both internal and external changes that motivated 
the Colombians to begin talks. The significance of the 
negotiations lies in the fact that Colombia had adamantly 
opposed negotiations throughout the mid-1970's, yet by 1979, 
had agreed to the extradition treaty.
The Diagnostic Phase
It is significant that a new anti-drug pact was signed 
between the U.S. and Colombia in 1979. It marked a reversal 
in the position of Colombia. As late as 1978, then-president 
Alfonso L^pez-Michelsen stated that Colombia did not have a 
drug problem— the United States did. According to Uopez- 
Michelsen, it was the U.S. demand for illegal drugs that 
caused Colombians to produce and export them. Drug 
trafficking, he stated, would never have reached such 
proportions if "a permanent number of customers did not exist
3Ibid., 50, 61, 52.
in the United States who supply large international chains 
with financing that have their origin in the very same United 
States."4 L<£pez-Michelsen was not alone in his accusation 
that North Amereica was responsible for the drug problem. 
Another Colombian writer was even more frank in his 
condemnation of the U.S.: "If the nearly 20 million permanent
marijuana consumers did not exist in the United States, it is 
clear that we would not have grown it nor would we be 
exporting it. This "chicken or egg" debate can be partially 
blamed for the failure of the two countries to work out an 
agreement prior to 1979. However, despite Lopez-Michelsen's 
rhetoric, Colombia was, in fact, already negotiating this new 
treaty. The 1979 agreement was actually an extradition treaty 
aimed specifically at narcotics traffickers. Since many drug 
dealers are Colombian nationals, the U.S. believed that this 
treaty would allow traffickers to be brought to America for 
trial and imprisonment. After years of dragging their heels 
in response to U.S. criticism to eradicate their drug 
production and trafficking, why in 1979, did the Colombians 
finally come to the table?
Richard B. Craig, "Colombian Narcotics and United 
States-Colombian Relations," Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs 23 (August 1981): 251.
Richard B. Craig, "Domestic Implications of Illicit 
Colombian Drug Production and Trafficking," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 25 (August 1983) : 330.
6By 1979, six essential developments persuaded the 
Colombian government to begin negotiating an extradition 
treaty with the U.S. aimed at reducing drug trafficking. 
These developments were powerful enough to induce the stubborn 
Colombians to admit that they had a serious drug problem and 
that extradition of their drug-dealing nationals to the U.S. 
was also in Colombia's best interests. Two of these 
developments were contained in the internal arena of Colombian 
politics; the other four were essentially external, and their 
effects influenced the action of the Colombian government. 
Increased Violence Threatened Domestic Order
First, violence and corruption in Colombia had increased 
to such a degree that domestic stability was threatened. In 
1977, Bogota, the capital of Colombia, averaged 50 kidnappings 
per month. Crimes in the capital could be linked to growing 
inflation and an unemployment rate of 11.6 percent; however, 
their sorry economic figures provide obvious reasons why even 
poorer, rural Colombians began to turn to narcotics as a 
source of income. In the first three months of 1979, in the 
small city of Santa Marta, (population 2 00,000) the capital 
of the Guajira province, there were 240 murders. The 
disorders in Guajira can be blamed directly on the drug trade: 
the Guajira province is the principal producer of Colombian
kpenny Lernoux, "Violence, Inflation Cloud Colombia's 
Political Future," Washington Post. 9 November 1977, A28.
7marijuana.7 Clearly, violence was undermining national order.
Besides the murders and kidnappings attributed to the 
drug mafia, Colombia also had to cope with nine different 
guerrilla groups. The atmosphere of lawlessness had not only 
overtaken the rural areas, where most of the guerrilla 
activity had traditionally taken place; it pervaded the city 
of Medellin, the headquarters of the infamous Medellin drug 
cartel; and the coastal cities of Baranquilla and Santa Marta 
had become as dangerous as the poorly patrolled countryside.
Rumors of police corruption in Colombia were widespread. 
A retired chief of the country's security police was accused 
of involvement in the drug trade and one of his underlings was 
found to be using his official car to transport drugs from
Q  . ,
Bogota to the coast. One U.S. official said simply, "A 
policemen up there [Guajira] is told by the smugglers that he 
has two choices: he can either get rich from payoffs, or he
can get killed. Because a policeman's pay starts at $46 a 
month, you can imagine the choice he makes."9 Rising 
inflation, fueled in part by "narco-dollars," and high
7Charles A. Krause, "Colombia, with US Backing, Mounts 
Drive on Drug Traffic," Washington Post. 2 0 June 1979, A17.
^ o n  Moreau, "Colombia: The Coke Trade", Newsweek. 20
December 197 6, 51.
9Everett G. Martin, "Colombian Gold: Guajira Peninsula
Becomes Chief Source of Marijuana for US," Wall Street Journal 
17 November 1978, 1, 41(E).
8unemployment contributed to the violence and corruption. 
Because both maladies were also linked to the drug trade, it 
became obvious that, until Colombia was ready to admit its 
role as one of the world's major drug suppliers rather than 
blame U.S. demand, corruption and violence would continue to 
disrupt society.
Economic and Political Implications of Drucr Money
Colombia, like most Latin American nations, is ruled by 
a well-to-do, well-educated oligarchy. Most participants in 
the drug mafia can hardly be called members of the Colombian 
upper class. Socially, illicit drug earnings are creating
nouveaux rich who are buying and bullying their way into the
• • . 1 0nation's class-conscious society. Economically, narcotics
traffickers and their huge incomes (some $1.5 billion annually 
in 1978) contribute to Colombia's growing inflation rate.11 
Finally, the violence and corruption associated with 
Colombia's rapid rise to the world's leading drug exporter 
was, by 1978, severely disrupting legitimate business. The 
collapse of the judicial system as well as the high crime rate 
jeopardized multinational corporations in Colombia. Foreign 
executives complained of having to compete with local
1Cfcraig, "Colombian Narcotics," 2 67.
1'lbid. , 266. See also Alfonso Chardy, "Colombia to
Attack Traffic in Cocaine," Washington Post. 11 March 1978, 
A20.
9businesses which constantly circumvented the law, doing 
everything from underinvoicing to reduce taxable income, to 
running drug smuggling operations of their own. In addition, 
the fear of mugging or kidnapping contributed to poor working 
conditions for foreigners.
The ruling elite in Colombia is most threatened by the 
efforts of the cartel to buy political power. Pablo Escobar, 
a major figure in the Medellin cartel, hands out cash to the 
poor, builds low-income housing projects and sponsors sports 
teams in Medellin. As a result, he has created a loyal 
following in his native city. Carlos Lehder Rivas, now in 
jail in Miami for drug trafficking, bought radio stations and 
newspapers and made substantial contributions to political 
campaigns. Most of the drug barons have used politics to 
protect their interests and bribe officials to ignore their 
illegal activities; since 1983, most of their efforts have 
been aimed at the judiciary in an attempt to prevent the 
Colombian government from extraditing suspected traffickers 
to the United States.13 Although it does not appear that 
these drug kingpins have any political goals beyond protection 
of their trafficking networks, the oligarchy is alarmed at the
•^'Colombia: How drugs and hot money disrupt business,"
Business Week. 12 June 1978, 73.
1%ruce Michael Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs," 
Foreign Affairs. 67 (Fall 1988): 77-78.
10
use of drug money in the political system.
Increased U. S. Demand for Drugs
Three important external developments greatly influenced
the decision of the Colombian government to come to the
negotiating table. By 1979 cocaine use in the United States
had reached unprecedented levels. From 1976 to 1977, the
number of 18-to-25-year olds who had used cocaine increased
from 13.4 to 19.1 percent. Between 1975 and 1978, the number
of high school seniors who had tried cocaine had jumped 20
percent.14 The rising demand for cocaine sent the street
value of the drug soaring to $800,000 per kilogram of cocaine,
which by the time it was sold in the U.S., was only 12 percent 
15pure.
The high price of cocaine made it the drug of the rich 
and famous; rather than deter its use, expensive cocaine 
became a status symbol. Snob appeal was important in the 
spread of cocaine use. In addition, cocaine provided a "high" 
without injection or hallucinations associated with 
stereotypical drug addition. It was far easier for people to 
justify snorting cocaine than using heroin, LSD, or similar
Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse 
and Control, Cocaine: A Major Drug Issue of the Seventies:
Hearings before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 24, 26 July, and 10 October 
1979, 13-14.
15Ebid., 9.
11
hard drugs. For drug dealers, cocaine was the "ideal" 
product; unlike marijuana, it was highly addictive, and unlike 
heroin and LSD, it was socially acceptable. The soaring U.S. 
demand for cocaine made drug trafficking more profitable than 
ever before.
U.S. Accusations Against Turbav Avala
The accusation by the United States that members of 
Colombian presidential candidate Julio C^sar Turbay Ayala's 
family were involved in drug trafficking received enormous 
international publicity. CBS's "60 Minutes" revealed that a 
confidential memorandum to President Carter from Dr. Peter 
Bourne, his special assistant on drug abuse, charged three 
prominent Colombian politicians with involvement in narcotics; 
the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Labor, and, most 
damaging, the ex-ambassador to the United States and 
frontrunner in the upcoming elections, Turbay Ayala.17 
Despite the denial by both Turbay and Diego Ascensio, then- 
U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, of any connections with narcotics 
traffickers, the allegations persisted. Turbay won the 
election despite the bad publicity, and in an attempt to 
silence the critics, he engaged in a much more active drug
tester Grinspoon and James B. Bakalar, Cocaine: A Drug
and Its Social Evolution. (New York: Basic Books, 1976), 61-
63 .
1 7 .Craig, "Colombian Narcotics," 252
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eradication program. So embarrassed was the new president by 
the accusations, that he agreed to cooperate with the United 
States to curb drug trafficking. In response to Turbay*s 
endeavors, the Carter Administration agreed to lend Colombia 
$2.4 million to train 6,500 soldiers that make up the
• • • 1 Qcountry*s drug interdiction forces.
The Ouita Sueno Treaty
In 1972, the U.S. signed the Quita Sueno treaty with 
Colombia. In the treaty, the U.S. renounced all claims to 
three Carribbean reefs: Quita Sueno, Roncador, and Serrana.
The reefs had been the subject of a dispute with Colombia 
since they were discovered to have large deposits of guano in 
1869. After the guano was exhausted, the status of the reefs 
remained in limbo until the expanded search for oil led to 
successful off-shore drilling. In 1928 Colombia and the U.S. 
agreed through an exchange of notes, to maintain the status 
quo pending a final settlement via negotiations.19
Although a treaty was signed in 1972, the U.S. Senate did 
not ratify it until 1981, after the extradition had been
■Charles A. Krause, "Colombia, with US Backing, Mounts 
Drive on Drug Traffic," Washington Post. 20 June 1979, A17.
19 . . .Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Treaty with Colombia Concerning the Status of Ouita Sueno.
Roncador and Serrana. report, 97th Cong., 1st sess., 1981,
exec. rept. 97-16, p. 1. Please refer to this document for
a brief review of Colombia*s claim to the reefs.
13
successfully negotiated. For Colombia, the territorial 
dispute had become a mini-Panama Canal issue: a small,
developing, Latin American nation seeking the return of part 
of its sovereign territory from the regional hegemon, the U.S. 
Ratification was delayed because of the entry of a third party 
into the dispute: Nicaragua, which had also laid claim to the 
reefs. In addition, the U.S. maintained that because the 
dispute involved territory, it should be referred to the 
International Court of Justice. When the U.S. and Colombia 
began talks about curbing the flow of Colombian drugs to 
American soil, the treaty became a bargaining chip. In 1978 
Jimmy Carter sent a letter to the chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, urging the Senate to ratify 
the treaty. He wrote that ratification would end the 
longstanding territorial dispute, enhance U.S. Colombian 
relations, and allow the U.S. an easy exit from the debate 
without having to deal with Nicaragua, a country whose 
political situation was careening rapidly out of control.20
The Senate considered the treaty again in December 1979, 
and endorsed a proposal introduced by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Samuel Eaton. Eaton called for approving 
the treaty subject to provisions that ratification neither
2Ctbid., 2-5. See also Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. 
Kline, eds., Latin American Politics and Development. 2d ed., 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 512, for a brief
chronology of US policy in Nicaragua immediately preceding the 
fall of Anastasio Somoza.
14
imposed obligations on nor prejudiced the claims of third 
parties (i.e., Nicaragua). After the U.S. informed the new 
Nicaraguan government of the latest developments in the 
negotiations, the situation was delayed again for nearly two 
years as Nicaragua tried to delay ratification. In a letter 
which he wrote to Congressman Lee Hamilton on July 14, 1981, 
Richard Fairbanks, then-Assistant Secretary for Congressional 
Relations, bluntly stated that "lack of ratification is a 
major irritant in our relations with Colombia . . .  a nation 
whose cooperation we often seek in other areas."21 Further, 
by 1981, it was no secret that US relations with the 
Sandinista government in Nicaragua were deteriorating. The 
same day it received the text of Fairbanks' letter, the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations voted 16 to 0 to ratify the 
treaty.
While it was not the sole incentive to negotiate, the 
Quito Sueno issue undoubtedly played a role in Colombia's 
decision to enter into talks with the U.S. on narcotics 
eradication that led to the drafting of the extradition 
treaty. Although relinquishing the reefs was a token gesture, 
it was evidence that the U.S. was anxious to negotiate. A 
less subtle development in Mexico, the massive defoliant 
campaign, provided an obvious and immediate explanation for 
the rise in Colombian narcotics trafficking and production,
21Ibid., 9.
15
which in turn led to dialogue.
Mexico's Successful Herbicide Program
A more important external development reveals why 
Colombian narcotics became so lucrative and widespread as to 
induce the government to negotiate with the United States: 
Mexico's herbicide campaign. Colombia was not always the 
leading exporter of illegal drugs to the U.S. On the 
contrary, Mexico had long assumed that dubious role. Its 
proximity to the U.S., as well as its vast areas of sparsely 
populated land, made it ideal for growing opium poppies and 
marijuana for export to the U.S. By the mid-197 0's, Mexico 
was estimated to supply 70 percent (10 million pounds) of all 
the marijuana consumed in the U.S. and 80 percent (8 tons) of 
all the heroin. Further, most of the cocaine coming into the 
U.S. passed through Mexico.
With such a high volume of narcotics originating in 
Mexico, it is not surprising that the United States applied 
pressure to eradicate the supply. On September 21, 19 69,
Mexico launched Operation Intercept; it was billed as the 
largest peacetime search and seizure operation in the nation's 
history. In reality, Operation Intercept sprang from economic 
blackmail, but it was significant in that Mexico admitted it 
had a drug problem, and that the two nations did schedule more
2Richard B. Craig, "La Campana Permanente," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 20 (May 1978): 107.
16
bilateral talks for the future.23
In addition to harsh fines for the possession and sale 
of drugs, the Mexican government also launched a herbicide 
campaign. Operation Condor was the first anti-drug strategy 
to involve the use of defoliants. In 1977 alone, 43,915 opium 
plots and 14,801 marijuana fields were destroyed. Mexican 
soldiers and federal police confiscated 192 kilograms of opium 
and dismantled 2 0 heroin laboratories; Operation Condor was 
a success. Although opium and marijuana fields continued to 
be discovered in Mexico, they were smaller in size and more 
widely dispersed. Operation Condor greatly reduced Mexico’s 
illegal narcotics production, but it had negative 
repercussions on Colombia.24
As a result of Operation Condor and Mexico * s crackdown 
on drug traffickers, many individuals moved their illicit 
businesses to Colombia. As Mexico's supply of drugs bound for
23Tbid., 110-111.
24kichard B. Craig, "Operation Condor: Mexico's Antidrug
Campaign Enters a New Era", Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs. 22 (August 1980): 357. Unfortunately,
Mexico's successful narcotics eradication was to be short­
lived; by 198 3 record drug seizures were made along the Texas- 
Mexico border. (At the time of the US-Colombian negotiations, 
of course, neither party could have predicted future events.) 
For an account of Mexican drug production and trafficking in 
the 1980's, please see Congress, House, Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Government Operations, Initiatives in Drug 
Interdiction (Part 1) : Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Government Operations. 99th Cong., 1st sess., 15 and 16 March; 
18 July; and 24 October 1985, 18-25.
17
the American market dwindled, Colombia's increased. Colombia 
is a much smaller country than Mexico, but by 1987 supplied 
25 percent of all imported refined cocaine. Although
Mexico's success in drug eradication contributed to the 
increased production and trafficking of illegal narcotics in 
Colombia, interesting questions were asked: "Could Colombia
implement similar measures to rid itself of drugs? Why hadn't 
Colombia followed Mexico's lead in reducing its illicit 
substance production? Regrettably, these questions have not 
resulted in a successful eradication campaign that could rival 
Operation Condor.
Role Conception: Mexico and Colombia
Rather than reiterate the obvious differences between the 
two nations that could have influenced policy choices, a 
subtle, but nonetheless important element is worth 
investigating: the role conceptions of Mexico and Colombia.
Role conception refers to the part a nation wants to play in 
the world arena. The United States has made an effort to be 
seen as the defender of freedom and democracy in the global 
community. The USSR often claims to speak for the workers of 
the world. Fashioning a national role is not limited to the 
superpowers? Third World nations have also attempted to forge
2%ruce Michael Bagley, "The New Hundred Years War? US 
National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America," 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 3 0 (Spring 
1988): 163.
18
distinct national personalities for a variety of reasons.
The influx of newly-independent states which resulted 
from decolonization brought a majority of less developed 
nations (often called the Group of 77) to the UN General 
Assembly. Through the UN, the Group of 77 called for the 
establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), 
which would result in the reconstruction of the global economy 
to benefit underdeveloped countries. Developing nations, 
realizing their majority in these organizations, began to 
promote their interests against those of Western nations.
The attention garnered by the Group of 77 was not lost 
on Luis Echeverria, Mexicofs president from 1970 to 76. He 
also sought to use his nation*s membership in international 
organizations to publicize his conception of Mexico's role in 
world politics. Echeverria believed that Mexico was destined 
to be regional leader in Latin Amnerica, and he searched for 
populist solutions to domestic problems while at the same time 
courting other Third World states into accepting Mexico as 
their spokesman.2 6
To assert that Echeverria was concerned with Mexico's 
international image is an understatement. The continued 
publicity from international and domestic sources forced 
Mexicans to face the embarrassing fact that their country had
2George W. Grayson, Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy. 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 21-22.
19
become one of the world's largest heroin producers. On 
November 7, 1975, a secret meeting was held in Mexico city
between General Ojeda Paullada and Sheldon Vance, senior
advisor to the Secretary of State. The next day, Ojeda 
informed Vance and the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Joseph John 
Jova, that the use of defoliants in his nation's drug
, , , . . .  9 7eradication campaign was to begin immediately.
As explained above, Mexico's decision to use defoliants, 
although controversial, was effective in eradicating huge 
amounts of marijuana and opium plants. While Mexico's desire 
to be the spokesman for Latin America was undoubtedly not the 
sole motivation for the decision to use herbicides, it
certainly contributed to the nation's willingness to acquiesce 
in U.S. demands that action be taken to stem the flow of
9  Qnarcotics. ° Indeed, Craig writes that Mexico became a 
signatory to every major drug treaty now in effect, and its 
attitude towards its role in international efforts to control 
the flow of illicit drugs was one of pride and commitment.29 
The undeniable success of Mexico's herbicide campaign and
0 7  # ^
Craig, "La Campana Permanente," 128.
2%ee Craig, "La CampafTa Permanente," 114-115, for a 
description of domestic drug use in Mexico. Growing concern 
about adolescent drug abuse in Mexico also contributed to the 
decision to use defoliants.
2%bid., 115.
20
the favorable publicity generated by its get-tough stance on 
drug eradication was not lost on the Colombians. Further, the 
anti-drug efforts gave Mexico a valuable bargaining chip in 
its relations with Washington, something any Third World 
nation would envy.30 Finally, with Mexico slowly
relinquishing center stage in the drug debate (although only 
temporarily), attention focused on Colombia, where many 
dealers had moved their operations and were already filling 
the gap in production created by Mexico* s war on drugs. After 
1975, the U.S. began to cite Colombia as the principal 
supplier to the American market not only of cocaine, but also 
of marijuana.
Unfortunately, it did not appear that Colombia's role 
conception was similar to that of Mexico. Colombia, much 
smaller in area and population than Mexico, had no desire to 
be a regional leader. Having just emberged from years of 
partisan violence, Colombia was in no position to be overly 
concerned with its reputation within Latin America or outside 
the region.31 
Conclusion
The six motivators above constitute the diagnostic phase.
3(fcraig, "Operation Condor," 360.
3%or an in— depth comparison of the anti-drug campaigns 
waged in Mexico and Colombia, see Peter Lupsha, "Drug 
Trafficking: Mexico and Colombia in Comparative Perspective," 
Journal of International Affairs. 35 (Spring 1981), 95-115.
21
Previously, Colombia was unwilling to enter into talks with 
the United States regarding narcotics eradication; however, 
by 1978, changes in circumstances had led Colombians to admit 
that they, too, could benefit from bilateral negotiations. 
These six factors were not the sole reasons that Colombia 
decided to negotiate, but rather represent an 
interrelationship of both internal and external developments 
that coincided with the beginning of bilateral talks. 
Additionally, the information on role conception can function 
as a warning that any future formula to eradicate narcotics 
must take into account the uniqueness of the Colombian 
situation; a uniform policy for all countries is often 
impossible. Once the decision was made to try negotiations, 
both countries had arrived at the next phase: the formula
phase.
CHAPTER II 
THE FORMULA PHASE
Introduction
After the diagnostic phase has occurred and the two 
parties have decided to negotiate, the formula phase follows. 
Having jointly determined that negotiations will benefit both 
parties, the two nations must then ascertain a framework 
within which they believe their goals can be attained. This 
search for general principles begins after both parties have 
jointly determined that negotiation is both possible and 
desirable. The single most important element of a formula is 
a shared perception of the problem— without it, the two sides 
will remain at a stalemate. As illustrated in the previous 
chapter, even when the initial dialogue had begun between the 
U.S. and Colombia, the two parties did not share the same 
perception of the drug trafficking problem. Only when
Colombia refrained from blaming the United States for the 
predicament and admitted that both nations could benefit from 
an agreement, was any notable progress made. When the two 
states realized that joint action on the narcotics dilemma
■^William Mark Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International 
Negotiation. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1988), 30-31.
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was crucial, they were more willing to admit that both the 
U.S. demand for drugs and Colombia*s supply of the illicit 
substances needed to be eradicated.
Zartman states that once the two parties are convinced 
that a mutually acceptable resolution to their disagreements 
is possible, they establish a formula governing the issues
, . psusceptible to solution. By 1976-77, the U.S. and Colombia 
had reached this stage and had begun to search for a formula. 
In this chapter, the elements that constitute the negotiation 
model *s formula phase will be discussed and will be applied 
to the 1976-79 U.S.-Colombian negotiations to stem narcotics 
trafficking.
The Search for a Formula
Two important characteristics that play a vital role in 
the initial search for a formula are relevance and 
comprehensiveness; it is imperative that the formula address 
the dispute and cover as many points of conflict as possible. 
As the disputants search for a formula, they are motivated to 
find a way to address the problem directly and extensively. 
When the parties meet these initial requisites, a final hurdle 
remains: irreplaceability. No formula, nor the ensuing
details that follow, will remain in force and achieve its 
purpose without this characteristic. Both parties have an
William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical 
Negotiator. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982), 89.
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interest in ensuring that the agreed-upon formula is not 
replaced by another. A formula that obviously gives more to 
one than to another invites reversal. In its final instance, 
the formula must motivate the two states to conclude and 
observe the agreement.
The essential qualities of the formula phase are simple 
enough to understand theoretically; however, it is also 
beneficial to view their practical application. Bagley and 
Tokatlicin use the formula-detail model to evaluate Central 
American peace initiatives, and their methods provide a 
guideline for locating the evolution of the formula phase in 
U.S.-Colombian negotiations. In their 1987 study, Bagley and 
Tokatli^n used the Contadora Group's Document of Objectives 
for peace in Central America as evidence of a formula.4 In 
the U.S.-Columbian case, an examination of both nation's 
objectives in their respective drug policies illustrated their 
goals and expectations. By incorporating both policies and 
achieving a consensus on the goals of negotiation, the two 
nations then moved to the next phase: the detail phase.
Search for Formula: The United States
The formula that would later be incorporated into the
3Ibid., 109, 117.
4Bruce Michael Bagley and Juan Gabriel Tokatli^n,
Contadora: The Limits of Negotiation. FPI Case Studies,
(Washington, DC: The John Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute,
1987), 26.
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negotiation with Columbia in 1979 began at a much earlier date 
than the actual talks themselves. The expectations of the
American government changed as a national drug policy was
hammered out. Before consolidation of this policy, there
could not be mush progress in negotiating a narcotics control 
plan with a foreign state. Before negotiations with Colombia 
began during the Carter administration, there was no national 
drug interdiction policy. During the Nixon and Ford years, 
inter-departmental squabbling and bureaucratic red tape 
prevented the U.S. from articulating a national anti-drug 
stance that would be necessary before venturing into bilateral 
talks with other nations on narcotics control.
In April 1976, President Gerald Ford ordered the
Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) to step up the interception of profits from the sale of 
narcotics. He believed that the financial paper trail left 
by the drug kingpins would lead to more success in narcotics 
interdiction than concentrating on small-time dealers. In 
response, the Treasury asked the White House for $20.6 million 
for intelligence operations and Assistant Treasury Secretary 
for Enforcement Activities, David MacDonald, submitted an 
ambitious 14-point plan that called for a strong IRS role in 
fighting the traffickers. Unfortunately, the White House 
Budget Office not only turned down the request for increased 
aid for intelligence, but also allowed the IRS Commissioner, 
Donald C. Alexander, to veto the MacDonald plan on the grounds
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that it required too much IRS involvement. Alexander 
submitted a much weaker plan of his own which received support 
from the White House.
The U.S. Senate issued criticism of its own in a report 
issued July, 1976. The Senate investigators cited lack of 
cooperation in exchanging information between the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the U.S. Customs Service. The 
DEA administrator, Peter Bensinger, admitted that "Customs and 
DEA relations have been strained," but insisted that they were 
improving. The Senate also disagreed with the "buy-bust" 
technique used by the DEA to arrest drug dealers, noting that 
the principal suppliers remained unpunished. Even worse, the 
Senate charged that such undercover practices were the cause 
of a "personal integrity problem" within DEA ranks.6
In addition to the in-fighting between the IRS and the 
Treasury Department, and the DEA and Customs, ubiquitous red 
tape also hindered the formation of a national drug policy. 
In June 197 5 Columbia embarked on its own anti-drug effort, 
"Operaci6n Cocina", which required special communications 
equipment. When a request was made to the U.S. government for 
the equipment, American narcotics officials insisted on 
conducting a "feasibility study" before purchasing it. Two
pr
Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Aborting and Anti-Drug 
Plan," The Washington Post. 22 September 1976, D17.
John Chadwick, "Senate Panel Assails US Drive on Drugs," 
The Washington Post. 18 July 1976, B3.
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months later, these officials decided that the Colombian 
campaign needed a different type of communications apparatus 
than they had originally requested. Colombia finally received
, /  , 7
the machinery shortly before Operacion Cocma ended.
The U.S. continued to struggle to forge a national drug 
policy and little headway was made during the transition from 
the Ford to Carter administrations. It was not until August 
1977, in a message to Congress, that President Carter unveiled 
his anti-drug plan. This address is significant because it 
had a markedly different focus from the efforts of the Ford 
administration.
Carter prefaced his remarks with the statement that 
illustrated the theme of future U.S. narcotics policies: 
international cooperation to control the production and 
transport of dangerous drugs into the country. He embellished 
this idea in his message, stressing that diplomatic agreements 
against cultivation and trafficking were indispensable. 
Before Carter even mentioned the seven points that made up his 
anti-drug strategy, he had set the tone for a national 
narcotics policy. The focus would be global— with efforts 
primarily directed at supply interdiction.8 To these ends,
7
'Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Red Tape Hinders Drug 
Crackdown," The Washington Post. 18 February 1976, D14.
Q
See Jimmy Carter, "International Cooperation to Control 
Dangerous Drugs," (Washington, DC: US Department of State
Bulletin, No. 1995, 19 September 1977), 380-381.
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diplomatic agreements would be the principle weapons in the 
war on drugs. The fact that Carter* s plan centered on an 
international effort reveals the absence of a consensus on a 
national drug policy. Little had changed to remedy the 
problems the Ford administration had encountered; most likely, 
Carter believed that it would be easier to achieve unanimous 
backing from Congress and the various departments if he 
stressed the need for a national effort against the foreign 
suppliers and traffickers of illicit drugs to the American 
market instead of concentrating on domestic narcotics 
interdiction.
The actual steps in Carter*s plan reflect the themes 
explained above. First, he proposed giving greater emphasis 
to the international narcotics control program and to 
reiterating to foreign governments the strong desire of the 
U.S. to curtail the production of, and traffic in, illicit 
drugs. To this end, Carter called on the various agencies of 
the U.S. government, namely the DEA and U.S. Customs, to 
assist in the international program to the best of their 
capacities. Second, he enlisted the help of the intelligence 
community in the collection and analysis of information 
relating to international drug trafficking. Third, the 
President stressed the need to aid developing countries with 
crop substitution programs and improve drug control measures. 
Fourth, he instructed international banks to use their 
influence to encourage the implementation of the above
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projects in developing countries. Fifth, Carter asked for 
improved international controls over dangerous drugs which 
also have legitimate medical usages. Finally, he emphasized 
that international expertise and cooperation among drug 
enforcement officials must be shared in order for this global 
effort to be successful.9
Carter's proposal concentrated on supply side 
interdiction rather than addressing U.S. demand for drugs. 
Although mentioning crop substitution, the focus of U.S. 
policy would be the use of international agreements to impede 
the production of, and traffic in, illegal drugs coming into 
the country. Other government officials concerned with the 
narcotics dilemma concurred with Carter's plan. Peter 
Bensinger echoed the president's intention to place more 
responsibility on drug-producing nations to arrest drug 
dealers and to destroy their bases of operations. Like 
Carter, Bensinger believed that without a firm Colombian 
promise of domestic narcotics interdiction, any chance of 
winning the war on drugs would be doomed: "I think the real
increase in presence is needed . . .  on the part of the 
Colombian judicial employees and a political commitment by the 
President [Julio C^sar Turbay] that he will not allow coca to 
be grown eight to nine times greater than what is legally
9Ibid., 381-382.
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needed.10
Carter's message to Congress provided the best example 
of the result of the search for formula. The U.S., unable to 
achieve consensus on a domestic narcotics policy, made 
international drug interdiction a domestic issue. In their 
negotiations with Colombia, the United States remained 
committed to this formula, and would seek details that would 
best implement it. Predictably, in bilateral negotiations, 
the U.S. pushed for international agreements that would 
guarantee the execution of their formula.
Search for Formula: Colombia
Like the U.S., the mid-1970's witnessed Colombia's search 
for a national narcotics policy. Before 1975, when Colombia 
emerged at the forefront of drug trafficking and production, 
the country encountered several obstacles in its search for 
a uniform drug policy. The unwillingness to accept any 
responsibility for the North American narcotics dilemma, as 
well as insufficient funds needed to ensure the success of any 
anti-drug campaign, prevented Colombia from developing its own 
effective formula. The administrations of L^pez-Michelsen 
(1974-78) and Turbay Ayala (1978-82) best illustrate the 
Colombian attempts at finding a formula to deal with the drug
1(fcongress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse 
and Control, Cocaine: A Manor Drug Issue of the Seventies:
Hearings before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 24 and 26 July 1979, and 10 
October 1979, 28.
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problem.
Although it was during Lopez-Michelsen's term that
Colombia's drug production and trafficking rose dramatically,
he did not develop a coherent plan for addressing the problem.
L^pez-Michelsen believed that it was U.S. demand for drugs
that remained at the root of the predicament, "the permanent
11number of American customers" was not Colombia's concern. 
However, during his administration, the estimated earnings 
from the drug trade were as high as $3.2 billion. Therefore, 
despite his rhetoric, L^pez-Michelsen realized that the 
astronomical profits of the drug trade endangered the 
Colombian economy.
The response of the L^pez Administration involved an 
attempt to harness this badly needed foreign currency for the 
benefit of the entire Colombian economy. The opening of the 
ventanilla siniestra (literally, the sinister window) at the 
Banco de la Republica allowed dollars to be converted into 
pesos with no questions asked. While it seemed like a good 
idea at the time, the government ran into trouble when coffee 
prices rose dramatically from 1975-77 as the result of a frost 
in Brazil. Foreign reserves increased too rapidly when 
coupled with the currency garnered from the "other economy" 
and the increasing coffee profits. Because the productive
13Robert H. Dix, The Politics of Colombia. (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1987), 52.
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capacity of the economy had not increased sufficiently to keep 
up with the money supply, inflation reached 20 to 30 percent. 
Lopez-Michelson found himself with a foreign capital surplus 
that was accompanied by high inflation. *
L^pez-Michelseon1s economic woes did not go unnoticed. 
In a report of a study mission to Colombia, the U.S. 
government acknowledged the link between "narco-dollars" and 
inflation, and L^pez-Michelson*s attempts to solve the 
problem:
Narcotics is responsible for approximately $1 
billion entering Colombia and contributes to the 
foreign exchange bonanza which has created 
tremendous inflationary pressures. The Colombian
3
Government1s attempts to control inflation are 
severely hampered by this increase in money supply 
which is not officially integrated into the fiscal
1 3system.
In spite of these monetary problems, L^pez-Michelsen did 
manage to make some progress on the drug issue before he left
•^arvey F. Kline, Colombia: Portrait of Unity and
Diversity. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 115-1116.
Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, 
United States in the Western Hemisphere: Report of a Study
Mission to Colombia. Ecuador. Peru. Chile. Argentina and 
Brazil to the Committee on International Relations. 95th Cong. 
2d sess. , 9-23 August 1977, (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1978), 
4.
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office. In 1977 more cocaine seizures than ever before 
illustrated his increased commitment. Colombian seizures of 
cocaine in 1977 represented a greater quantity than the total 
amount confiscated in the United States in that same year. 
In addition, in December, 1977, he established a select 
narcotics unit under the Attorney General, for which the U.S. 
provided training through the DEA. Further, the success of 
this unit and the effective use of three helicopters furnished 
by the United States prompted increased American funding for 
the nascent anti-drug campaign. Despite L^pez-Michelsen 
citing North American demand as the sole cause of drug 
production and trafficking, as he neared the end of his term 
in office, he had begun to implement programs that focused on 
eliminating drugs at their source. Through these initial 
efforts, a Colombian formula began to emerge.'*'4
In part because of the economic problems of his 
predecessor, President Turbay took an even more active stance 
against illicit narcotics. The Attorney General's Anti- 
Narcotic Unit continued to be successful. In 1978 total 
cocaine seizures by all enforcement agencies in Colombia (the 
military, the National Police, Customs, and the Department of 
Administrative Security) totalled 650 pounds. During the 
first three months of 1979, that amount had been exceeded,
•^ee K. Mathea Falco, "Narcotics: International Control
Program," (Washington, DC: US Department of State Bulletin, 
No. 2015, June, 1978), 44.
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with most of the seizures being made by the Attorney General's
1 C .  „
Unit. Despite these successes, in 1978 it had become
obvious that the implications of the "other economy" on 
Colombia were escalating. The illicit income earned by 
Colombians from all drug sales: (1) contributed approximately 
6 percent to the nation's 3 0 percent inflation rate and 15 to 
18 percent of the growth of its money supply, growth that 
could not be controlled; (2) jeopardized Colombia's financial 
institutions and rendered precarious all forms of governmental 
economic planning? (3) contributed substantially to Colombia's 
becoming a food-importing country through the conversion of 
crop lands and rural laborers to drug production rather than 
that of staples; and (4) became the largest source of dollars 
in the underground economy, adding millions to the nation's 
foreign exchange surplus, a surplus that had already caused 
economic problems and could not be regulated in the future.16
Although during the Lopez-Michel sen Administration it had 
been obvious that the U.S. was more concerned with drug 
eradication than was Colombia, these problems associated with
1Jfcongress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse 
and Control, Factfinding Mission to Colombia and Puerto Rico: 
A Report of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, Committee Print 16, p. 
3.
Richard B. Craig, "Domestic Implications of Illicit 
Colombian Drug Production and Trafficking," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 25 (August 1983): 
328-329.
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the drug economy had magnified. Colombia was no longer 
benignly trafficking drugs to foreign markets. By 1978 both 
the United States and Colombia had reason to cooperate in the 
search for a solution to the narcotics dilemma, and Colombia's 
reversal of its previous recalcitrant stance revealed just how 
concerned the nation had become over the looming problems 
linked to the drug trade. Still, Colombia simply did not have 
the resources to combat the drug traffickers solely via the 
use of a domestic eradication campaign. In order to rid 
themselves of the drug menace, Colombians would need outside 
financial backing. Possibly because the measures taken by 
L^pez-Michelsen had failed (the ventavilla siniestra debacle) 
and, in addition to the economic instability caused by the 
drug trade, Turbay agreed with the U.S. that stopping illicit 
narcotics at the source was paramount. For Colombians, the 
benefit of cooperating with the U.S. formula meant the 
elimination of a serious domestic problem whose consequences 
were only likely to get worse, without having to finance it 
alone. True, it meant accepting publicly some of the 
responsibility for the inter-American narcotics problem (which 
L^pez-Michelsen had been unwilling to do) but, by 1978, 
Colombia had been unable to devise a successful, affordable 
plan of its own.
Conclusion
Both the United States and Colombia had overcome 
significant obstacles by the time the two countries had agreed
36
upon a formula. The U.S. had to formulate a plan that would 
be acceptable to the various departments that compose its huge 
bureaucracy, and Colombia had to come to terms with the 
previously unforeseen domestic problems associated with the 
drug trade. The final formula possessed the needed relevance 
that Zartman deems crucial for it to succeed. The "search and 
destroy at the source" formula devised by the U.S. certainly 
addressed the problem of narcotics production and trafficking? 
however, two other important characteristics, 
comprehensiveness and irreplaceability, were not similarly 
evident.
The U.S. formula did not cover many points of the 
dilemma. Although Jimmy Carter mentioned crop substitution 
in his seven-point plan, the bulk of the two nations' efforts 
centered on financing police training and intelligence 
equipment. Further, the U.S. did not contribute much to stem 
the demand for drugs by increasing narcotics abuse programs. 
This lack of comprehensiveness was further testimony to the 
absence of consensus within the U.S. bureaucracy on how to 
deal with the domestic drug problem. Finally, the fact that 
Colombia had acquiesced in the U.S. formula meant that it 
might be replaced easily. It obviously placed more pressure 
on Colombia? the U.S. simply had to finance the operations, 
but Colombians were left to actually implement the program. 
Zartman warns that if a formula gives more to one nation than 
to another, the country that comes out on the short end will
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not be as motivated to observe it. (Unfortunately, the
formula would not prove to be irreplaceable, and Colombia
withdrew from the agreement in 1986 in part because of the
1 7above reason.)
Now that Colombia had agreed to the U.S. formula, the 
details had to be defined. While the two countries had come 
a long way by achieving a consensus on a formula, their 
conception of supply side eradication needed to be clarified.
A discussion of the details of the formula followed, with the 
object of implementing the formula and concluding 
negotiations.
17 .^Chapter 4 will provide further elaboration on the 
results of the formula that caused the Colombian Supreme Court 
to declare the extradition treaty, the most important detail, 
invalid in 1986.
CHAPTER III 
THE DETAIL PHASE
Introduction
The third and final phase of the negotiations model, the 
detail phase, occurs after a consensus has been reached on the 
formula. In the case of the U.S.-Colombian negotiations in 
the mid-1970s, it was proposed that the problem of narcotics 
trafficking be solved by implementing a formula championed by 
the Americans: supply-side eradication via diplomatic
agreements. Once the two nations had agreed to this formula, 
the actual details of the plan had to be constructed. Exactly 
what was meant by "diplomatic agreements"? How much aid was 
Colombia, as a drug-producing nation, to receive to help fund 
the eradication process? And what was the precise role of the 
United States in this somewhat asymmetrical formula? These 
important questions would be answered in the detail phase.
This chapter will first explain the detail phase of the 
model in greater depth before focusing on how this phase was 
manifested in the real world— that is, in the U.S.-Colombian 
negotiation process.
The Detail Phase: A Definition
If the formula phase is analogous to the "ends," then the 
detail phase can be described as the means to these goals.
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By placing the details last in order, the parties are able to 
concentrate on broader, uniting goals of the talks rather than 
getting bogged down with minor details early in the dialogue. 
Zartman and Berman note that the detail phase is often the 
most complex of the three phases because of the hostility 
encountered. By definition, details are specific and are more 
likely to cause conflict than the more general formula phase. 
The two authors acknowledge that because of its complexity, 
the detail phase is not necessarily limited to one single 
model and the guidelines for negotiating details may come from 
a wide range of different, overlapping cues and models.1
The detail phase most resembles the "offer-counteroffer" 
negotiation model: the parties send signals (offers and
demands), make concessions, exchange points (converge), 
arrange details, and finally bring the negotiations to an end. 
Habeeb stresses that although the detail phase looks 
remarkably similar to the of fer-counterof fer model, the merits 
of the phase lie in the fact that it is only the last of three 
stages (the first two are largely preparatory) , and represents 
the culmination of arduous communication and groundwork that 
offer-counteroffer neglects.
1 # .I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, The Practical 
Negotiator. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982),
148-149.
William Mark Habeeb, Power and Tactics in International 
Negotiations. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1988), 31.
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The Detail Phase: U.S. and Colombia
As previously mentioned, during the negotiations between 
the United States and Colombia on the diplomatic agreements 
that were to implement the U.S. formula (i.e., the details), 
three obstacles had yet to be overcome: (1) the content of
any "diplomatic agreement" to be concluded between the two 
nations? (2) the roles both countries would play in 
implementing the formula; and (3) any supplementary measures 
that could be used in tandem with diplomatic agreements. 
These important issues had to be settled during the detail 
phase. While both nations had managed to find some consensus 
on the goals of negotiation during the formula phase, they 
still needed to resolve the above issues and conclude the 
negotiations.
The Meaning of "Diplomatic Agreements"
The United States had intrinsically linked diplomatic 
agreements to the implementation of their formula for 
narcotics eradication, but the term "diplomatic agreement" had 
yet to be defined specifically. Obviously, if the U.S. 
intended to focus its anti-drug plans on producing states, 
national sovereignty concerns meant that diplomatic accords 
would be crucial. The United States did not define 
immediately the content of any diplomatic agreements as they 
worked out their formula, but instead described international 
cooperative measures: "We must work closely with other
governments to assist them in their efforts to eradicate the
41
cultivation of drugs," President Carter stated in his August 
2, 1977 message to Congress.3 In that same address, Carter 
also cited the work of the United Nations (UN) in its efforts 
to help drug-producing states find alternative crops and 
improve drug control measures, but no mention of any pacts or 
treaties was made.
The immediate aftermath of the presidents address was 
characterized by much debate and little action. In the fall 
of 1977, the House of Representatives held hearings on a 
federal drug strategy in an effort to work out the details of 
the international anti-drug formula. During the hearings, 
Rep. Lester L. Wolff, Chairman of the Select Committee on 
Narcotics Abuse and Control, complained that despite the 
involvement of the DEA, the State Department, and the newly- 
created Office of Drug Abuse Policy, it was unclear which 
department would head the international narcotics eradication 
effort and what measures were to be taken: "We have got a lot
of lipservice and got very little in way of response."4 
During 1978, however, the United States would succeed at 
defining and implementing these measures.
3Jimmy Carter, Public Papers of the President 1977. Vol. 
2, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office,
1978), 1401.
4Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control, Oversight Hearincrs on Federal Drug Strategy before 
the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. 95th 
Cong., 1st sess., 23 September; 6 and 12 October; and 15-16 
November 1977, (Washington, DC: United States Government
Printing Office, 1978), 30.
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By 1978 action accompanied the rhetoric: the United
States was actively pursuing concrete agreements with drug- 
producing countries rather than vaguely requesting inter­
national cooperation in the war on drugs. In a September 23, 
1978 news conference, Carter announced that the United States 
had worked out an agreement with Mexican President Jose Lopez 
Portillo to eliminate poppy fields, which were the principal 
source of heroin in the Western hemisphere. During 1978 the 
U.S. signed a series of accords with Mexico specifically 
designed to serve as weapons in the war on drugs. These 
agreements preceded steps that would be taken with Colombia 
to wage a similar campaign in that country. From these varied 
agreements, a clearer picture of the U.S. narcotics control 
formula emerged.
On April 3, 1978, the U.S. and Mexico signed a protocol 
stating that the U.S. would spend $500,000 to provide
. 7  . .helicopter training for Mexican pilots. In addition to the
Jimmy Carter, Public Papers of the President 1978. Vol. 
2, (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office,
1979), 1599.
^Mexico (and Colombia, for that matter) was not the only 
country involved in a flurry of diplomatic activity with the 
United States over the drug issue. See Department of State, 
"Venezuela: Cooperation in the Narcotics Field," 28 March
1978, TIAS no. 92 35, United States Treaties and Other 
International Agreements. vol. 30, pt. 1, for US efforts with 
another Latin American nation.
7Department of State, "Mexico: Narcotic Drugs:
Helicopter Pilot Training," 3 April 1978, TIAS no. 9234, 
United States Treaties and Other International Agreements.
vol. 30, pt. 1.
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U.S.-funded pilot training program, the two countries also 
concluded several other agreements, all part of a larger anti­
drug package. On May 15, 1978, the United States pledged
$7,000,000 for special scanners and aircraft to assist the
Mexicans in illicit crop detection, crucial to any drug
. . .  8eradication campaign. Less than two weeks later, m  an
exchange of notes, the U.S. agreed to give Mexico $500,000 (it 
was later amended to $1,855,000) , to assist them in their drug
. . . . Qinterdiction and eradication programs. In August 1978, the 
U.S. agreed to send aircraft, spare parts, and training to 
Mexico. This package included eight helicopters and one cargo 
aircraft, and carried a price tag of $4,620,000.10 In 
addition to the monetary and personnel assistance, the United 
States and Mexico also signed an extradition treaty in 1978, 
for the express purpose of extraditing suspected drug 
traffickers to the United States for trial.11 From Mexico's
Q  , .
Department of State, "Mexico: Narcotic Drugs: Illicit
Crop Detection System," 15 May 1978, TIAS no. 9248, United 
States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 30, 
pt. 1.
9Department of State, "Mexico: Narcotic Drugs:
Additional Cooperative Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic," 
24 May 1978, TIAS no. 9258, United States Treaties and Other 
International Agreements, vol. 30, pt. 2.
19}epartment of State, "Mexico: Narcotic Drugs:
Provision of Aircraft," 23 August 1978, TIAS no. 9254, United 
States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 30, 
pt. 1.
13Department of State, "Mexico: Extradition," 4 May
1978, TIAS no. 9656, United States Treaties and Other 
International Agreements, vol. 31, pt. 3.
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example, it is possible to see the details of the U.S. 
formula: "diplomatic agreements" cover everything from
extradition treaties to aid packages, all part of the anti­
drug effort.
In the negotiations with Colombia, the United States 
placed great emphasis on diplomatic agreements that included 
financial aid as well as treaties; however, the principal 
weapon in the war on drugs in Colombia would prove to be the 
extradition treaty the two nations signed in late 1979. This 
all-important detail was not the lone agreement? like Mexico, 
the U.S. and Colombia concluded several agreements aimed at 
reducing the illicit narcotics supply.
There were three principal diplomatic agreements signed 
by the U.S. and Colombia: an extradition treaty, an agreement
to provide financial aid for the purposes of drug 
interdiction, and a mutual legal assistance treaty. An 
examination of the three primary agreements illuminate the 
details of the U.S. anti-drug formula with Colombia.
The Extradition Treaty
The most publicized achievement of the negotiations was 
the extradition treaty between the two countries, signed on 
September 14, 1979. Despite the fact that both nations had 
agreed that increased narcotics eradication and interdiction 
in Colombia was crucial to solving the drug dilemma, the 
treaty negotiations were not problem-free. An April 1979 
report to the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and
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Control expressed concern over two developments that halted 
the negotiation. First, Colombia*s laws, fashioned on the 
Napoleonic code, prohibited taking testimony from a person 
involved in a crime under a grant of immunity. According to 
Colombian law, any individual who participates in a crime must 
be prosecuted if he is identified. Second, at the time the 
extradition treaty was being negotiated, Colombian law did not
recognize the crime of conspiracy except in matters involving
12 . treason. The U.S. sought to extradite persons suspected of
criminal conspiracy involving the production or trafficking
of narcotics. At the time the report was issued, it was hoped
that the two nations could resolve these differences, and
conclude an agreement.
Obviously, these problems were solved, because by
September, the two nations had signed the extradition treaty.
The tenth article of the treaty stated that the "Requested
State" may consider the evidence furnished in support of an
extradition to be insufficient and under such circumstances
can require submission of additional evidence. In addition,
the Requested State could set a time limit for the
Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse 
and Control, Factfinding Mission to Colombia and Puerto Rico: 
A Report of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control. 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, Committee Print 96-1-2,
p . 8.
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. 1 •presentation of such evidence. Presumably, this article
allowed for a Colombian judge to refuse, as evidence, the 
testimony of a culpable witness who has been granted immunity. 
Article 2 of the treaty provided for extradition "for 
association to commit offenses as provided by the laws of 
Colombia, and for conspiracy to commit an offense as provided 
for by the laws of the United States."14 The treaty 
apparently equated the American crime of conspiracy with the 
Colombian conception of "crime by association." These two 
conflicts solved, the U.S. and Colombia concluded the 
extradition treaty.
Cooperation to Curb Illegal Traffic
Another important detail in the U.S. anti-drug formula 
was contained in the form of an exchange of notes that entered 
into force on August 6, 1980. In the exchange of notes, the 
United States agreed to pay $13,225,000 for supplying and 
maintaining helicopters, patrol vessels, fixed radar 
equipment, transport vehicles, and fuel, which were to be used
1 Rexclusively for interdicting drug traffic. The exchange of 
notes was notably more concise than the various agreements
i:fcongress, "Extradition with the Republic of Colombia," 
Senate Treaty Doc. 97-8, (Washington, DC: US Government
Printing Office, 1981), 4-5.
1^Ebid. , 2.
^■^epartment of State, "Colombia: Narcotic Drugs:
Cooperation to Curb Illegal Traffic," 6 August 1980, TIAS no. 
9838, United States Treaties and Other International
Agreements. vol. 32, pt. 2.
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Mexico and the U.S. had signed, specifying the different aid 
packages in each treaty. As the U.S. executed their anti-drug 
formula, the effort did become more streamlined; Colombia and 
the U.S. concluded only three principal agreements aimed at 
narcotics eradication.
The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
On August 20, 1980, the United States and Colombia signed 
a treaty on mutual legal assistance. In the treaty's 
preamble, the two countries stated that the purpose of the 
treaty was to "provide for more effective cooperation between
1 g
the two states in the repression of crime. "*L The agreement 
specified the channels of communication and the nature of the 
legal assistance upon which each country could rely. While 
it was not mentioned expressly in the treaty, the legal 
assistance that would be given would probably follow a request 
for extradition. Taking testimony, effecting the appearance 
in the Requesting State of persons located in that country, 
producing records, serving legal documents and providing 
evidence would most likely be activities that would occur
I
after a request for extradition hhd been filed. While an 
extradition treaty specifies the circumstances under which 
extradition may take place, a mutual legal assistance treaty 
provides a guideline for legal conduct after the extradition
•Congress, Senate, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with 
the Republic of Colombia. 97th Cong., 1st sess., Senate Treaty 
Doc. 97-11, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1981), 1.
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has taken place.
Roles in Implementation of the Details
Besides revealing the means of implementing the formula, 
the three details explained above also defined the roles both 
nations were to play in the execution of the formula. The 
extradition treaty, the financial aid agreement, and the 
mutual legal assistance treaty were all bilateral 
arrangements, but they placed considerably more pressure on 
Colombia than on the United States. The three details reveal 
their asymmetry, and this asymmetry would prove to be the 
downfall of the salient element, the extradition treaty.
The extradition treaty, although aided in part by the 
mutual legal assistance treaty, placed most of the burden on 
Colombia. Colombia would be required to arrest and indict its 
nationals, and Colombian judges would have to approve orders 
of extradition to transport accused individuals to the United 
States for trial and imprisonment. The treaty was termed a 
bilateral agreement, but it was obvious that few U.S. citizens 
would be extradited to Colombia for drug trafficking. The 
treaty may have been signed by both parties as equal 
participants, but the actual implementation of the details 
would be left to the Colombians.
A similar criticism could be leveled against the 
financial aid package that the two nations concluded in August 
1980. The United States provided the dollars for the 
equipment and manpower. After allocating the funds, the U.S.
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really had no other major role to play; Colombians would be
responsible for the actual implementation of any eradication
and interdiction campaigns. The U.S. formula, by
concentrating on the supply of drugs more than the demand, was
destined to retain these incongruities when the details were
implemented. As mentioned earlier, Zartman and Berman warn
that any formula that places more pressure on one party than
1 7the other is destined to have problems. After the
negotiations on the anti-drug package were concluded in August 
1980, the actual measures taken by Colombia via these 
agreements would prove to have dire effects on the internal 
stability of that nation, so dire that Colombia withdrew from 
the extradition treaty in late 1986. Because the U.S. formula 
had been so dependent on Colombia for its actual implementa­
tion, Colombia's withdrawal dealt a serious blow to U.S. 
narcotics policy.
Supplementary Measures to Support the Actual Details
With U.S. emphasis on eradicating drugs at their source, 
and with a formula designed to accomplish that task, an 
investigation into the supplementary measures, if any, the 
U.S. was prepared to take to support the details of the 
formula, is necessary. In other words, did the United States 
make any effort to reduce the demand for drugs? Was the 
American appetite for illicit narcotics addressed in the
1 7Zartman and Berman, 89.
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nation*s attempt to devise a anti-drug strategy in the mid- 
19701s? President Carter did indeed address the nation*s 
domestic abuse problem in his message to Congress in August, 
1977. Carter promised to improve the quality of Federal drug 
treatment programs and recommended two steps to that end: he
instructed to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
to expand resources devoted to care for drug abusers; and he 
directed the Secretary of Labor to identify all federal 
employment assistance programs which help former drug abusers,
and to make recommendations to increase the access of drug
1 8 . abusers to these programs. These measures involved little
more than reviewing existing drug abuse programs. No concrete
financial increases were allocated at this time.
Several months later, the House of Representatives
conducted hearings on federal narcotic strategy and, not
surprisingly, the subject of the nation's demand for drugs was
again raised. At the time of the hearings (fall 1977) an
interagency review team under the leadership of the Office of
Drug Abuse Policy planned to conduct a study of the current
national programs to reduce the demand for drugs, and make
1%'immy Carter, Public Papers of the President-1977. Vol.
2, (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978),
1404-1405.
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. • 19recommendations for improvement.
During the same hearings, the committee heard the 
testimony of Richard L. Williams, Deputy Associate Director 
for Organization and Management in the Office of Drug Abuse 
Policy. Rather than address any future steps that were to be 
taken to improve the country's abuse programs, Williams' 
testimony was confined to a discussion of the high volume of
• • , Of)narcotics entering the U.S. via the border with Mexico. The 
text of the hearings was more than 600 pages long, and most 
of the testimony and prepared statements addressed the problem 
of international trafficking, rather than the demand for 
drugs. Recommendations for review of current drug abuse 
programs were mentioned, but no concrete action was taken.
The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control also 
held hearings in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of 
investigating narcotics trafficking proceeds. The committee 
was particularly interested in "establishing a factual record 
regarding the means by which traffickers move their illegal 
and untaxed money and the financial devices they employ in
1%ongress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse 
and Control, Oversight Hearings on Federal Drug Strategy 
before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. 
95th Cong., 1st sess., 23 September; 6 and 12 October; and 15- 
16 November 1977, 16.
29tbid. , 375-396.
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o i . .their conspiracy." Chicago was chosen as the site of the 
hearings because of a recent discovery of a Mexican drug
network that used Chicago banks to transfer large sums of
7 2 , , ,money to Mexico. As was the case m  the hearings described
above, the demand for drugs did not assume an important place
in the discussions in Chicago. Drug money filtered through
legitimate financial institutions by Latin American drug
cartels involved narcotic-producing nations. Certainly it was
important to devise solutions to these problems, but it was
also equally important to recommend supplementary measures to
reduce demand for drugs.
The debate over how to reduce drug abuse in the United 
States continued to be plagued with much discussion and little 
action or appropriation of funds. In 1978, the Select 
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control conducted hearings 
specially devoted to prevention of drug abuse, and committee 
members expressed exasperation at the lack of tangible results 
in improving existing drug abuse programs. Rep. Benjamin 
Gilman stated, "And here we are some 15 months after a new 
administration has come into office that is still talking 
about studying the possibilities of reorganizing,
^Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse 
and Control, Investigation of Narcotics Trafficking Proceeds. 
Hearings before the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 30 September and 1 October 
1977, 1.
22Lbid.
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. . . 2 3 .coordinating, and unifying the Federal drug effort."* His
colleague Glenn English was even more blunt: " . . .  there has 
been no indication that the program that the Federal 
Government has been carrying out has done one blooming thing 
or accomplished a single thing."24 During 1978 the Office of 
Drug Abuse Policy had ceased to function and its personnel 
transferred to the Domestic Policy Staff. The congressmen 
seemed confused with exactly what office and which persons 
were in charge of the nation's drug abuse policy. Gilman
O K
called the reorganization "musical chairs." This first 
hearing (April 18) illustrated the inability of Carter's staff 
to assess the nation's drug abuse programs and make 
improvements to reduce the demand for drugs. The remainder 
of the hearings did not address the narcotics abuse programs 
directly. The April 20 hearing was devoted to the role of the 
media in drug abuse programs; the next hearing, five days 
later, concentrated on private efforts to end drug abuse; the 
hearings in May focused on drug abuse in public schools and 
heard the testimony of local officials on this problem. It 
is clear from the hearings that while Americans' appetite for 
drugs was of concern to policy-makers in the Carter
2Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse 
and Control, Prevention of Drug Abuse: Hearings before the 
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. 95th Cong., 
2d sess., 18, 20, and 25 April; 16 and 25 May 1978, 22.
24Ebid., 23.
2%bid., 24.
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Administration, it was hardly a highlight of the U.S. war on 
drugs.
When the United States was engaged in negotiations with 
Colombia to devise an anti-drug package, it paid very little 
attention to ways of reducing the demand for illicit 
narcotics. Most of the supplementary measures that were 
discussed were confined to different aspects of reducing the 
supply of illegal drugs entering the U.S.— not ways to reduce 
the number of American customers who constituted the largest 
market for cocaine, heroin and marijuana. In sum, although 
the detail phase was successful in precisely defining the U.S. 
formula, it was obvious that the United States was not 
prepared to do more than supply the Colombians with money and 
legal assistance to hasten the extradition process. Any 
expanded drug abuse programs to reduce the demand for 
narcotics would not figure prominently as a detail in the U.S. 
formula.
Conclusion
With the conclusion of the detail phase, the U.S.- 
Colombian negotiations on narcotics eradication were, in fact, 
finished; the planning had been completed, but the 
implementation of the formula and details would prove to be 
the true judge of the talks. The previous three chapters 
endeavor to illuminate the negotiation process for the purpose 
of discerning the motives and goals of both parties. The 
reader is no doubt curious about the actual life and
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accomplishments of the anti-drug package. The fourth, and 
final, chapter addresses these questions and serves as an 
epilogue to this discussion of the formula-detail model.
CHAPTER IV 
THE FAILURE OF THE TREATY
Int.rod.uct ion
This chapter is devoted to an assessment of the U.S. 
formula and the details used to implement that formula. 
Unlike the previous three chapters, chapter four will not 
analyze the negotiation process but will evaluate the most 
important detail in the U.S. formula, the extradition treaty, 
and offer an explanation as to why it was perceived by the 
Colombians to be too costly a proposition to continue. 
Further, while the bulk of the thesis discusses events that 
occurred during 1975-79, this chapter will address the issue 
as it stands in 1989.
As was stated earlier, the failure of this treaty dealt 
a tremendous blow to the United States* war on drugs. Even 
before its demise, the U.S. government made the extradition 
treaty the focus of its anti-drug crusade, and signed new 
extradition treaties with several other nations besides 
Colombia— Mexico (1978), Costa Rica (1984), and Jamaica 
(1984). The treaty with Colombia was especially significant. 
The Medellin cartel was estimated to control 80 percent of the
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cocaine traffic to the United States.1 With the terms of the 
treaty designed to cover almost all aspects of the drug trade, 
from money laundering to customs violations, it appeared as 
though the kingpins would at last be brought to justice. 
Recent developments in Colombia, however, have revealed the 
failure of international law as a means of stifling the drug 
trade. The dependence of the economy on narcotics, its unique 
political history, and Colombiafs determination to solve its 
own problems are three factors that contributed to the 
inability of international law to function effectively against 
drug smuggling. The demise of the U.S.-Colombian extradition 
treaty can be attributed to these factors and is the subject 
of this chapter.
The Treaty
There were two previous U.S.-Colombian extradition 
treaties (signed in 1888 and 1940), neither of which contained 
language aimed at drug trafficking. As a result, these 
earlier treaties were considered ineffective in combatting 
narcotics smuggling. The 1979 treaty was, therefore, drafted 
with the purpose of removing legal loopholes and updating the
i . . .Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Recent 
Developments in Colombia: Hearing before the Committee on
Foreign Affairs. 100th Cong., 2d sess., 27 January 1988, 8.
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earlier efforts of the two governments.
Historically, an individual could not be extradited 
unless he had committed a crime specified as an extraditable 
offense under the terms of the treaty.3 The 1979 treaty 
removed this obstacle: any crime that was punishable by a year 
or more in prison in either the U.S. or Colombia constituted 
an extraditable offense.4 By increasing the scope of 
extraditable crimes to include all felonies, the treaty 
greatly increased the likelihood that narco-traffickers could 
be extradited.
In Article 8, the treaty addressed instances when 
extradition of foreign nationals could take place. Rather 
than limiting extradition to foreigners who had committed 
unlawful acts on U.S. soil, the treaty specified that if the 
crime took place in either country with the intent of 
violating the law in the requesting state, extradition would
c . . .be granted. In other words, drug dealers who initiate the
o
Congress, House, Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and 
Control, Study Mission Report of the US Congressional 
Delegation to the Andean Parliament, Paipa and Bogota. 
Colombia, report, 100th Cong., 1st sess., 1987, Committee 
Print, p. 10.
3 .J. Richard Barnett, "Extradition Treaty Improvements to 
Combat Drug Trafficking," Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law. 15 (1985): 300.
4Congress, Extradition Treaty with the Republic of 
Colombia. Sen. Treaty Doc. 97-8, Washington, DC: GPO, 1981, 
1-2 .
5Ibid., 3.
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smuggling of drugs to the U.S. from inside Colombian borders 
were guilty of an intent to violate U.S. law, and subject to 
extradition.
These strict provisions were accompanied by an appendix 
of the schedule of offenses. This appendix specified 
"offenses against the laws relating to the traffic in, 
possession or manufacture of, narcotic drugs, cannabis, 
hallucinogenic drugs, cocaine and its derivatives, and other 
substances which produce physical or psychological 
dependence." Further, an "offense against public health, such 
as the illicit manufacture of or traffic in chemical products 
or substances injurious to health" was deemed an extraditable 
crime. This provision was primarily aimed at persons who may 
be found in possession of certain chemicals (i.e., ether) used 
to process raw coca paste into cocaine. The schedule also 
made offenses against the laws relating to international trade 
and transfer of funds extraditable crimes. Authorities were 
often alerted to the activity of drug dealers through 
irregularities in financial transactions at banks. The huge 
cash profits generated by narcotics trafficking are usually 
"laundered" through various financial institutions. If 
bankers can detect the trail, a narco-traficante is often the 
cause. Under the 1979 treaty, money laundering was grounds 
for extradition.
The specificity of the 1979 treaty with Colombia gave 
rise to other extradition treaty improvements designed to
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restrict the activities of drug dealers. In his article 
"Extradition Treaty Improvements to Combat Drug Trafficking," 
J. Richard Barnett explains how innovations in the 1984 
treaties with Thailand, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Italy 
"reflect an increased administrative commitment to surmount 
obstacles m  international law enforcement efforts." Like 
the U.S.-Colombian treaty, these treaties closed loopholes in 
the definition of both extraditable crimes and conspiracies 
to commit extraditable offenses. In his conclusion, the 
author is optimistic about the new treaties: "Such substantive 
and procedural improvements to the extradition process should 
aid government efforts to fight narcotics trafficking and to 
improve the effectiveness of United States' international law
•7
enforcement efforts." If the treaty improvements were so 
well received by legal scholars, why has the U.S.-Colombian 
treaty been ineffective in combatting drug trafficking? The 
answer is that the importance of drugs in Colombia's economy 
and the country's political development have created 
conditions that have proven hostile to the treaty.
Economic Implications of the Drug Trade
The economic implications of the drug trade in Colombia 
are difficult to document with precise statistics, but some 
research has been conducted by Colombian social scientists.
6Barnett, 285.
7Ibid., 315.
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Craig cites their findings and has identified several conse­
quences that result from narco-trafficking. First, the income 
earned by Colombians from drug sales contributes approximately 
6 percent to the nation's 3 0 percent annual inflation rate, 
and prevents the government for engaging in sound economic 
planning. Additionally, it shrinks the pool of money 
available for legitimate lending and raises credit rates so 
high that people turn to traffickers for financing. In 
addition to the impact of illegal income on monetary policy, 
the cultivation of the coca leaf means that croplands are 
diverted from food output to drug production, making Colombia 
increasingly dependent on imported foodstuffs. The drug 
trade or la otra economia profoundly affects the Colombian 
economy.
While the influential drug barons in the Medellin cartel 
become rich from drug profits, their monies do not trickle 
down to the campesino who grows coca or marijuana on a small 
farm. Although he may earn more from a drug crop than from 
a staple crop, he is not increasing his income by a huge 
margin. It is estimated that the small marijuana farmer 
receives 7 percent of the drugs' total expert value while some 
50 billion pesos annually (US $155,279,503) goes to no more 
than 250 people. Fifty billion pesos is nearly 40 percent of
Richard B. Craig, "Domestic Implications of Illicit 
Colombian Drug Production and Trafficking," Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 25 (August 1981): 
328-29.
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Q
the Colombian government's budget.
In addition to the extra income, the peasant is further 
enticed to grow coca by the nature of the plant itself. It 
is a hearty species, able to reach maturity in 18 months,
yielding several harvests per year and remains productive for
103 0 to 40 years. w The Colombian government has passed an 
agricultural reform bill specifying that experts supervise and 
assist the efforts of peasant farmers, but their visits to 
small farms in remote areas are, at best, sporadic.11 Coca 
production by campesinos is virtually unregulated, leaving the 
peasant at the mercy of the drug lords and the government. 
Colombia's legal system has not been able to employ the law 
as an effective measure of coercion. The only deterrent to 
the peasant farmers is the fact that growing coca is illegal. 
Supply versus Demand Argument
As has been noted several times in this thesis, the high 
demand for drugs in the US has made possible the huge profits 
garnered by Colombians traffickers. Colombians have long 
pointed to American demand as the primary cause of the drug 
problem. The supply vs. demand argument initially hampered
9Ibid., 328.
1(feichard B. Craig, "Colombian Narcotics and United 
States-Colombian Relations," Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs. 23 (August 1981): 244.
i:koward J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, Latin American 
Politics and Development. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), 
259.
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any US-Colombian solution to the drug problem, but as the 
Colombian government became more aware of the corruption and 
violence caused by the drug mafia, the prospect of bilateral 
talks became more attractive. (Despite the early successes 
in the talks, the American preoccupation with eradicating the 
of drugs at their source created undue pressure on Colombia
• .  i?and led to the demise of the extradition treaty.)
The Failure of the Treaty: Colombia's Political Development 
Barnett cites an anecdote appearing in Atlanta Magazine: 
"Corruption is so prevalent in Colombia that federal sources 
report that the mayor of Santa Marta closes the city airport 
to commercial flights each night and permits drug traffickers 
to use it. The mayor is said to personally greet each plane
1 3 .for his money." This example of overt corruption may not be 
illustrative of all local government officials, but it is 
evidence that the corruptive power of the drug lords has 
become a serious threat the delicate political balance that 
Colombia has forged after twenty years of political violence. 
That period in history has come to be known as La Violencia. 
and it disrupted Colombia from 1948 to 1968.
In the 1930*s, Colombia's two major political parties 
were attempting to implement different programs for land
1%ee Kenneth E. Sharpe, "The Drug War: Going After
Supply," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 
30 (Summer-Fall 1988): 77-85, for a concise evaluation of the 
ineffectiveness of supply-side eradication.
1 Barnett, 291.
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reform. Peasants who supported the losing party were often 
forced to surrender their land to other peasants who were 
associated with the winning side. The assassination of Jorge 
Gaitcfn, candidate for president in 1946 and the heir apparent 
to the leadership of the Liberal party, aggravated La 
Violencia. In the next twenty years, some 200,000 Colombians 
lost their lives fighting in the name of party loyalty. A 
long term result of the conflict was that an entire generation 
of Colombian peasants grew up thinking that violence was the 
normal way of life.14
Colombia finally extricated itself from the civil war in 
the late 1950's with the creation of the National Front. The 
brainchild of Alberto Lleras Camargo, a Liberal, and Laureano 
(?6mez, a Conservative ex-president, the National Front won the 
approval of the Colombian people in a plebiscite and was 
approved by the National Congress as a constitutional 
amendment in 1958. In effect from 1958 to 1974, the National 
Front was a plan to avoid the intense party rivalry that had 
been a major cause of La Violencia. The plan's most important 
reform included an alternating of the presidency between the 
two parties, dividing equally all legislative bodies, and 
prohibiting political participation by other parties during 
this period. The National Front did not end violence 
overnight, but after six years, most of the violence had
■^iarda and Kline, 257.
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1 rceased.
Despite the end of La Violencia. the scars of nearly two 
decades of brutal political violence remained. La Violencia 
was only the last in a period of six different outbreaks of 
partisan violence since the mid-1800's. An entire generation 
of Colombians had been exposed to political violence and 
accepted it as an unfortunate fact of life. The intense 
partisan competition created institutionalized violence that 
has become an integral part of Colombian society. The 
terrorist tactics used by the drug dealers to intimidate the 
government and the populace alike is not a new development. 
Previously, the Liberal and Conservative parties employed 
violence to achieve their political goals; today, drug dealers 
have adopted similar tactics.
The Failure of the Treaty: The Role of Violence
Violent intimidation of government officials attempting 
to curb the drug trade is a key factor in the failure of the 
extradition treaty. The 1984 assassination of Justice 
Minister Rodrigo Lara and the 1988 slaying of attorney general 
Carlos Mauro Hoyos illustrated the ruthlessness of the drug 
traffickers. Without a doubt, Colombia has seen more 
government officials as well as private citizens murdered by 
the drug dealers than has the United States. Juan G. 
Tokatlian states that this is an essential difference in
15Ebid., 258.
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perceptions of the United States and Colombia as to how the 
drug problem should be solved. The United States has focused 
on eradicating the source of the narcotics before they reach 
American soil. The most important tool with which to achieve 
this goal had been the extradition treaty. In Tokatlian's 
opinion, the treaty has been a cause of the increase in drug- 
related violence. In addition, he believes that the treaty 
failed to reduce the entry of drugs into the United States and 
was ineffective in deterring those already in the narcotics 
business. It did not improve bilateral relations and has not 
strengthened legal instruments to deal with narcotics problem. 
The Colombian judiciary has been devastated by the violence 
employed by the traffickers. If the US government continues 
to pursue a policy of extradition, the drug dealers will 
continue to terrorize the judiciary.16
As the dealers have resorted to violence to protect their 
interests, they have employed new groups to carry out their 
activities. Increasingly, they have turned to several of 
Colombia's nine guerrilla groups. In November 1985, the M-19 
(the April 19th Movement) took over the Palace of Justice in 
Bogota and killed the Supreme Court Justices they had taken 
hostage. It is generally assumed that the Medellin cartel
%uan G. Tokatlictn, "National Security and Drugs: Their 
Impact on Colombian-US Relations," Foreign Affairs. 67 (Fall 
1988): 149.
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paid the M-19 guerrillas $1 million for their services.17 
This incident was the most obvious evidence of a link between 
the guerrillas and the drug barons,-signaling the arrival of 
the "narco-guerrilla" on the scene.18
The cartel made use of the guerrillas in 1985, but it is 
a tenuous alliance. There is a history of animosity between 
the drug dealers and the guerrillas dating back to 1981, when 
M-19 kidnapped the daughter of Jorge Ochoa, one of the 
cartel's leading members. Ochoa called a meeting of the 
wealthiest traffickers and they agreed to form their own 
counter-terrorist group. Funded by donations of $7.5 million 
from each member at the meeting, the organization called 
"Death to the Kidnappers" or MAS, has used its own violent 
measures to prevent extortion by the guerrillas. The decision 
to pool their resources for the benefit of the cartel marked 
the beginning of a strong united front against the efforts of 
any outsiders to undermine their activities.19
In addition to forming MAS, the cartel has sparked 
further conflict with the guerrillas by purchasing acres of 
land in rural areas for the cultivation of coca. These areas 
are often located in guerrilla strongholds, and the cartel 
refuses to pay tribute to the guerrillas for protection. They
1 7Bruce M. Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs," 
Foreign Affairs. 67 (Fall 1988): 83-84.
■^^Tokatlian, 146.
1%agley, Colombia and the War on Drugs. 76.
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have used their immense wealth to equip MAS with the latest
• « 7 f)weaponry and have recruited others to protect their farms.
Following the 1985 incident at the Palace of Justice and 
the rising death toll of judges murdered by the cartel *s 
hitmen, the intimidated Supreme Court ruled the 1979 U.S.- 
Colombian extradition treaty unconstitutional on procedural
7 1 . .grounds. Claiming that because the treaty had been signed 
by a minister acting on behalf of the president and not the 
president himself, the Court considered it an invalid 
document. When the President signed the treaty to reinstitute 
it, the Supreme Court declared that it had no power to render
7 7opinions on extradition matters. The violence perpetrated 
by the Medellin cartel has been a primary reason for the 
failure of the extradition treaty.
The Failure of the Treaty: National Sovereignty
It is evident that the United States1 drug eradication
policy has left most of the responsibility with Colombia to
arrest and extradite drug smugglers and locate and destroy 
processing laboratories and coca farms. According to the
director of Colombia's Narcotics Bureau in the Attorney-
29cbid. , 84-85.
2 "feruce M. Bagley, "The New Hundred Years War? US 
National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America," 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. 3 0 (Spring 
1988): 173.
2%than A. Nadelmann, "The DEA in Latin America: Dealing 
with Institutionalized Corruption," Journal of Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs, 29 (Winter 1978-88): 36.
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General's office, Francisco Bernal, "We're being left to fight 
the war alone. We're supplying the dead, the country is being 
destabilized." The pressure administered by the U.S. has 
Colombians worried. Although they are carrying out American 
anti-drug measures, if their actions fail to show results, 
they fear the U.S. government will take more decisive action. 
Operation Intercept (1969) and Operation Condor (1975) in 
Mexico and Operation Blast Furnace (1986) in Bolivia exemplify 
the United States1 administering its own measures to wage the 
war on drugs in Latin America. Operation Blast Furnace 
involved assistance from the U.S. military in the destruction 
of several cocaine labs in Bolivia. Despite the dismantling 
of the labs, few arrests were made.24 Unlike Mexico and 
Bolivia, who openly sought U.S. assistance in their anti-drug 
campaigns, Colombia has thus far refused to trade its national 
sovereignty for a decrease in narcotics exports. While 
Colombians willingly accept American dollars to fund the 
eradication efforts, the aid has stopped short of an actual 
U.S. presence in the country.
The United States continues to stand by the extradition 
treaty despite the violence it caused. The U.S. cites 
intimidation of the judiciary by the drug barons as evidence 
of the paralysis of the Colombian legal system that can be
2%agley, New Hundred Years War. 173.
24Paul B. Goodwin, Jr., ed., Latin America. 3d ed., 
(Guilford, CT: Dushkin Publishing Group Inc., 1988), 182-83.
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blamed on the cartel. Extradition is the only means of 
convicting and incarcerating the narcotics traffickers. 
Colombians argue that it is extradition itself that has caused 
the violence. Since the signing of the 1979 treaty, there has 
been a dramatic increase in terrorisin by the Medellin cartel; 
however, an incident in late 1987 reinforced the possibility 
that the U.S. might resort to direct intervention to restrict 
the cartel’s activities. Jorge Ochoa, one of the founders of 
the Medellin cartel, was arrested for a traffic violation. 
When Colombian police realized who he was, he was imprisoned 
and held for extradition. However, before he could be 
extradited, he was released from prison, reportedly paying 
$3.8 million to bribe his way out of jail. The United States 
responded by tightening the inspection of products shipped 
from Colombia, including such perishable items as shrimp and 
flowers. Colombians see the U.S. response as retaliation 
and resent the suggestion that they are unable or unwilling 
to solve the drug problem.
After the Treaty
While the Colombian and United States governments attempt 
to reach an agreement on a policy that will fill the void left 
by the failure of the extradition treaty, many solutions to 
the problem are being offered. Judicial reform is potentially 
the most promising suggestion. Higher salaries for the
2 l^iatin American Weekly Report (London) , 21 January 1988.
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presently overworked, underpaid judiciary members, the 
introduction of plea bargaining, and the use of the police for 
investigative research would enable the system to be more 
efficient.26 A strong, uncorrupted judicial system would be 
a powerful weapon against the drug traffickers that would also 
enable Colombia to punish its citizens without intervention 
from the United States.
In the foreign policy arena, the U.S. government has been 
criticized for its lack of financial support of the anti-drug 
efforts in Colombia. Badly needed monies could provide 
herbicides for spraying, more sophisticated security for 
judges and witnesses, and a larger intelligence force. In 
addition to funding, the United States could contribute to the 
promotion of economic alternatives to the drug trade. 
Lowering import barriers for exports like coffee, sugar and 
flowers would provide incentive for small farmers to cultivate
07
legitimate crops.
The most controversial answer to the drug dilemma, the 
legalization of narcotics, is politically unpopular in the 
United States. Nevertheless, legalization would reduce the 
huge profits garnered by the drug barons and enable
O  Q
governments to regulate and tax the enterprise.
2%cott B. MacDonald, "Colombia’s Legal System and the 
Drug Trade," 10 June 1988, unpublished manuscript, 19.
27Bagley, Colombia and the War on Drugs. 90-91. 
2%Tadelmann, 97-108.
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Scholars and politicians alike have many proposals. 
While the debate drags on, drugs continue to be smuggled into 
the United States and Colombia's political system is still 
wracked with violence. With the extradition treaty in limbo, 
the Colombian courts are resisting efforts to extradite their 
nationals for trial in North America. In May 1988, the 
Conseio de Estado. Colombia's highest court on institutional 
and administrative matters, suspended the issuing of arrest 
warrants with the purpose of extradition. It cited the case 
of Pablo Escobar, a Medellin cartel member, as precedent. The 
motive behind the court1s action was to force the extradition 
debate into the executive branch. In order to secure any 
future extraditions, the government will have to seek 
congressional approval for a new law to validate the 1979 
treaty.29
Although American officials accept the judgment of the 
Colombian Supreme Court that the 1979 treaty is invalid, 
diplomats continue to search for other valid extradition 
treaties rather than explore alternate policies. As late as 
October 2, 1988, the Mexico City News reported that efforts 
were underway in the United Nations to draft an international 
extradition treaty. An American official insists that it will 
be easier for Latin American governments to apply pressure to 
drug traffickers under the mantle of multinational
2%jatin American Weekly Report. (London), 26 May 1988,
1 0 .
73
TO . . .  . . . .cooperation. It is impossible to verify this prediction,
and it would seem that, whether extradition is enforced by the 
US or an international organization like the UN, the drug 
dealers will resist it with violence, and that violence would 
most likely occur in Latin America. This author expects the 
intimidation tactics in Colombia to continue as long as the 
present anti-drug policies of the U.S. remain unchanged. 
Unfortunately for Colombia and other Latin American nations 
that have fallen victims to the retaliatory measures of the 
drug barons, it does not appear that the United States will 
abandon its policy of extradition.
Conclusion
The formula-detail model uses simple concepts to 
illustrate what is often a complex process. While the product 
of the U.S.-Colombian negotiations, the anti-drug package is 
easily discernable and therefore open to criticism, the actual 
process that gave birth to the extradition treaty and the aid 
program is not as readily identifiable? however, the use of 
models devoted to the decision-making processes at work during 
negotiation, provide valuable insight into the eventual 
outcome of the dialogue. The seeds of failure of the U.S. 
anti-drug formula were sown in the early negotiation 
process— the Colombians judiciary cannot take sole blame for 
the failure of the treaty. Although the shortcomings of the
3%exico City News. 2 October 1988, 16.
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U.S. formula are revealed in the model, formula-detail is not 
predictive. It is impossible to tell from the 1975-79 
negotiations what options will now be used in the face of the 
treaty*s demise. Although it seems that eradication and 
interdiction are still the most important weapons in the war 
on drugs, it is not known whether or not the U.S. government 
will continue to adhere to these policies.
EPILOGUE
This thesis was completed in July, 1989. At the time, 
U.S.-Colombian negotiations on narcotics control had reached 
a stalemate. Events in August 1989, brought the drug issue 
renewed attention in the media. On August 18, a leading 
presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galan, was assassinated 
on the orders of the Medellin cartel. Galan1s murder prompted 
Colombian president Virgilio Barco Vargas to call for 
immediate renewal of the defunct extradition treaty. ”If they 
don't handle it this time, it may well be the end of the line 
for the credibility of the executive branch of Colombia," says 
Robert Merkle, the former U.S. attorney who prosecuted Carlos 
Lehder.31
In addition to renewing the extradition treaty, in the 
week following Galan's murder, Colombian police seized $200 
million worth of the drug dealers' property and ordered the
33Linda Feldman, "Colombian Drug Battle: Challenge for the
U.S.", Christian Science Monitor. 24 August 1989, 2. Carlos Lehder 
was the last Colombian drug trafficker to be extradited to the 
United States under the extradition treaty. In 1987, he was 
sentenced to life in prison without parole.
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• . . .  T Odestruction of all unregistered airstrips by September 10. 
The traffickers responded by bombing several banks and 
government offices in Medellin. The violence is intensifying, 
and at this writing, Colombia may be facing the final battle. 
Whether the Colombian judiciary will remain intact to formally 
extradite arrested traffickers will be crucial, if either the 
U.S. or Colombia is to win the war on drugs.
3%ames Brooke, "Attacking the Sovereign State of Cocaine," New 
York Times. 27 August 1989, sec. 4, 1.
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